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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether differences across countries in overall country-specific trade 
costs affect comparative advantage. It does so by examining whether the commodity 
composition of countries’ trade is driven by differences in countries’ trade costs, as well as by 
differences in traditional factor endowments. Industry export shares across up to 71 countries 
and 158 manufacturing industries for five year periods over the period 1972 to 1992 are shown 
to be greater in trade cost sensitive industries for countries with relatively low national trade 
costs. This is after controlling for factor-intensity differences across industries and for 
endowment differences (physical and human capital) between countries. Further, these 
relationships are more evident in exporting to global markets than to local or regional markets. 
 
JEL classification: F14 
 









1.  Introduction 
2.  Country Trade Costs 
3.  Trade Costs in Theory 
4.  Empirical Approach 
5.  Result 
6.  Conclusions Non-Technical Summary 
Overall trade costs include all the costs associated with delivering a good from the producer to final users 
overseas, other than the cost of producing the good itself.  A number of recent studies have indicated that 
these costs, if broadly defined is this way, are greater than we had believed  If this is so, then there are 
good grounds for believing that patterns of international trade may be affected not only by relative 
production costs but also by these trade costs. The literature on international trade has tended to 
concentrate on the trade volume effects of trade costs and on whether goods are traded or not. There has 
been relatively little consideration of how trade costs affect trade patterns and sources of comparative 
advantage internationally. In the present study we concentrate on how trade costs matter empirically for 
the pattern of trade; in particular on whether differences in national trade costs are a source of 
comparative advantage. It follows on from a recent strand of the literature that considers whether specific 
types of trade costs affect comparative advantage and the composition of trade. Nunn (2007) for example 
finds that countries with good contract enforcement (good “rule of law” conditions) export more goods for 
which contract enforcement is more important. In similar fashion, Levchenko (2007) shows that countries 
with better institutions specialize in goods that are more complex in terms of the range of inputs used in 
production. To the extent that institutions, in general or specific types of institutions, affect trade (rather 
than production) costs, then trade costs are represented as a source rather than modifier of comparative 
advantage and trade patterns. In this paper we extend on this tradition by considering the whole gamut of 
institutional and infrastructure characteristics of countries which induce inter-country differences in overall 
national trade costs. We view these differences in country trade costs as reflecting sustained and 
systematic features of geography and stage of development. They may arise from differences in the 
overall quality of countries’ infrastructure and institutions, and in the competitiveness or effectiveness of 
their business and policy environments. Indeed, we find empirical support for country trade costs being an 
‘endowment’ which affects the pattern of comparative advantage and export composition. This is revealed 
in export performance at the industry level for a sample of up to 71 countries and 158 industries for 5 year 
periods over the period 1972 to 1992. Countries with lower trade costs are found to export more of those 
products for which trade costs are more important, having controlled for traditional endowment influences 
on export performance in manufacturing products and for other industry, country and time specific effects.  






A number of recent studies have indicated that trade costs, especially if broadly defined to 
include less easily identified and measurable information-related costs of transacting 
internationally as well as the costs of transportation, are greater than we had believed 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Hummels, 2007).  If this is so, then there are good 
grounds for believing that patterns of international trade may be affected not only by 
relative production costs but also by these trade costs, indeed even to a possibly greater 
extent.  Deardorff (2004), for instance, shows theoretically that a country may have a 
comparative advantage (or disadvantage) in a good relative to the world based on the 
country’s costs of production relative to the world average production costs, but if trade 
costs are sufficiently high the country may import (export) this good.  The literature on 
international trade has tended to concentrate on the trade volume effects of trade costs 
(e.g. in the gravity model literature), and on the related issue of traded and non-traded 
goods (Dornbusch et al., 1977).  There has been relatively little consideration in either the 
theoretical or empirical literature on how trade costs affect trade patterns and the sources 
of comparative advantage.  In the present study we concentrate on how trade costs matter 
empirically for the pattern of trade; in particular on whether differences in national trade 
costs are a source of comparative advantage.  
 
The study draws upon that strand of the empirical factor proportions literature that 
explores the cross-commodity or –industry relationship between export performance and 
the factor intensities of commodities or industries.  This strand dates back to correlations 
established by Keesing (1966) between US export performance and industry skill 
intensities; a positive correlation for the highest skills and a negative one for unskilled 
labour.  Similarly regressions of US net exports (aggregate and bilateral) by industry 
reported by Baldwin (1971) showed a range of significant relationships to cross-industry 
factor intensities.  This strand of the literature was rendered unfashionable, however, by 
the criticism, forcibly made by Leamer (1980, 1984), that cross-commodity or industry 
comparisons had weak theoretical underpinning.  He demonstrated that industry export 
performance did not depend in a strict Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model on the input 
characteristics or factor intensities of industries.  As with that strand of the empirical 
literature interested in measuring the factor content of trade to test the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Vanek (HOV) model, the cross industry methodology has been revived. Among other 
things, this revival has been driven by recognition of and allowance for non-factor price 
equalization (and cross country differences in production techniques).  With the factor price 
equalization (FPE) requirement removed, the commodity (industry) structure of production 
and trade can be determined.  Romalis (2004), for example, shows that, conditional on 2 
 
factor prices, industry export performance in a quasi-H-O model is determined by industry 
input characteristics, or more specifically in terms of the interaction of industry factor 
intensity and relative factor prices (or relative national endowments of factors).  The 
empirical application of the model (US import shares of 123 countries in 370 industries) 
shows a strong influence in particular of relative skill intensity and abundance on countries’ 
shares of US imports; skill abundant countries capturing greater market share of skill-
intensive goods and the exports of low human capital countries being concentrated on low 
skill-intensive industries. 
 
Although the theoretical model used by Romalis (2004) incorporates trade costs, there is 
no consideration of trade costs in the empirical modelling.  With assumed uniformity of 
trade costs across pairs of trading partners, trade costs do not alter relative (production 
and trade inclusive) costs across countries.  Trade costs in this theoretical set-up serve 
rather to fashion the incentive to trade or not; the number of non-traded commodities 
(with intermediate factor intensities) increasing with trade costs.  If trade costs differ 
across pairs of trading partners, any given country will source a particular commodity from 
the lowest trade cost-inclusive source.  But the lowest cost source may now also differ 
across importing countries.  This leads Deardorff (2004) to distinguish between ‘local’ and 
‘global’ comparative advantage.
1  A country may have a comparative advantage 
(disadvantage) in a good relative to the world, when one compares its relative costs of 
production globally, but if trade costs are sufficiently high (or at least for some countries) a 
global comparison may be inappropriate for determining trade patterns.  Rather the 
appropriate comparison may be with those ‘local’ countries, that is those countries having 
the lowest costs of trading with the country.  Comparative advantage should be defined in 
this context to explain trade to take into account trade costs, giving greater weight to less 
distant and lower trade cost countries.  
 
The literature discussed thus far is either concerned with how endowments affect relative 
international production costs or with how trade costs may modify or alter endowment-
driven trade patterns.  There is, however, a strand of the literature that considers types of 
production and/or trade costs as a source of comparative advantage.  Nunn (2007) for 
instance considers whether the ability to enforce contracts (thereby reducing the costs of 
acquiring intermediate inputs) affects a country’s comparative advantage in the production 
of goods requiring relationship-specific investments.  Using data for 1997 for exports by 
146 countries in 182 industries, he finds that countries with good contract enforcement 





more important.  In similar fashion Levchenko (2007) shows that countries with better 
institutions specialize in goods that are institutionally dependent (i.e. more complex in 
terms of the range of inputs used in production).  To the extent that institutions, in general 
or specific types of institutions, affect trade (rather than production) costs, then trade 
costs are represented as a source rather than modifier of comparative advantage and trade 
patterns. In this paper we extend on this tradition by considering the whole gamut of 
institutional and infrastructure characteristics or endowments of countries which induce 
differences in overall national trade costs. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  The concept of national differences in 
trade costs is explored and illustrated in section 2.  In section 3 the theoretical implications 
of alternative aspects of trade costs are reviewed.  This in turn provides the underpinning 
for the empirical approach set out in section 4.  The results of applying this empirical 
approach are provided and discussed in section 5.  Finally, section 6 offers the summary 
conclusions of the study. 
 
2.  Country Trade Costs 
 
When broadly defined, trade costs include all costs in delivering a traded good from its 
producer to a final user overseas (other than the marginal cost of producing the good 
itself).  Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) define trade costs so as to include transport 
costs (freight and time), costs induced by tariff and non-tariff barriers, information costs, 
contract enforcement costs, legal and regulatory costs, and local distribution costs in 
export markets.  These authors review a range of literatures and methodologies to provide 
direct and indirect (inferred) estimates of the individual components of aggregate or 
country-wide trade costs.  They report an overall (average) ad valorem tax equivalent for 
trade costs broadly defined in this way for a representative industrial country (USA) of 
170%; broken down multiplicatively into local distribution costs (55%) and international 
transaction costs (74%).  It is recognised that there will be variation in overall trade costs 
across countries (in particular between industrial and developing countries), but also that 
there are constraints on the systematic measurement of aggregate costs across countries 
and over time by this type of a bottom-up approach. 
 
Some, but only some trade costs, will vary also across products, with variation in policy 
barriers or in the transportability of goods.  (We do in part allow for these differences by 
measuring differences in the trade cost sensitivity of product groups  at the industry level.)  
There are, however, likely to be systematic differences in trade costs across countries for 
all products associated with geographic and developmental differences in the quality and 4 
 
efficiency of countries’ institutions, infrastructure, business and policy environments.  It is 
these differences in (average) overall trade costs that we wish to concentrate on for the 
present purpose.  The comprehensive measurement of country trade costs is, however, 
problematic.  This is in part because data availability constrains measurement across large 
numbers of developed and developing countries and over time.  It is also because it is 
difficult to aggregate across all policy-sources of trade costs (i.e. across tariffs and non-
tariff barriers) and simultaneously across policy and non-policy (e.g. transport and other 
geography) sources of trade costs.
2  As a result, we consider alternative proxies of trade 
costs, which capture policy and non-policy sources to differing degrees.  We borrow 
estimates from Hiscox and Lastner (2008) of trade openness, based on an annual, country 
specific (fixed) effect estimated from a gravity model of bilateral trade flows which controls 
for national incomes of, and distance between, any two trading partners.  The larger the 
(overall) country specific effect the more trade policy open the economy is viewed to be.  
There are potential limitations of the proxy, given that a general gravity model is not 
estimated and trade policy is presumed to be multilateral.  However an index (ICY), which 
correlates quite well with other trade policy indicators and does capture some non-policy 
sources of trade costs, is available for 76 countries and for each year over the period 1960 
to 2000.   
 
We also use the measures of access to markets and sources of supply proposed by 
Redding and Venables (2004); market access (MAc) of each exporting country being the 
distance-weighted sum of the market capabilities of all partner (j) countries, and supply 
access (SAc) of each importing country being the distance weighted sum of the supply 
capabilities of all partner countries, such that: 
 
() ∑
− = j cj c M MA
σ π
1
        ( 1 )  
() ∑
− = j cj c S SA
σ π
1
        ( 2 )  
where  cj π  = bilateral transport costs 
  j M  = market capacity 
  j S  = supply capabilities 







MAc  and  SAc are predicted from a gravity model of bilateral trade, which controls for 
distance, a dummy for a common border, GDP in both countries and country and partner 
dummies.  The coefficients of the country and partner dummies provide the estimates for 
the market and supply capacities, and coefficients on distance and border dummy variables 
are used to estimate bilateral transport costs.  We use this same methodology to estimate 
MAc and SAc for the same sample of countries as that for which the Hiscox-Lastner (H-L) 
index is available and eighteen additional countries, and for each of the years 1972, 1977, 
1982, 1987 and 1992.  (See Appendix 1 for the gravity model estimates used to construct 
MAc and SAc.) 
 
For trade cost intensity or sensitivity, again we explore alternative possible proxies for 
trade cost intensity (ti).  One is the share of intermediate inputs in the value of final output 
(input int); the greater is this in the production of the goods of a particular industry, the 
more transactions intensive and potentially imported input intensive is production assumed 
to be.  The presumption is that there may be a greater incentive to specialise in the 
production of goods that are more dependent on intermediate inputs in low trade cost 
countries.  The alternative indicator of trade cost sensitivity focuses on the direct 
sensitivity of trade volumes to the effects of trade barriers or costs.  We take the elasticity 
of substitution (es) estimates reported by Hummels (1999) for each 2 digit import 
category, from an import demand function estimated (using OLS) for pooled data for US, 
New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay.  Finally, we use (like Levchenko, 
2007) an Herfindahl index of intermediate input use.  This allows us to explore whether 
concentration of intermediate input use on a limited number of inputs is more important in 
affecting the location of international production than overall input dependency.  (The data 
and data sources for both the measures of country trade costs and trade cost sensitivity or 
intensity at the industry level are described in section 4 below.) 
 
Differences in Country Trade Costs 
Average national trade costs based on each of the measures for the sample period 
(averages across each of the years 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992) are set out in 
Appendix 2.  There are elements of consistency across the alternative measures, but also 
differences associated with different components of trade costs.  There is a general 
tendency across the alternative measures for the industrial countries to have relatively low 
trade costs compared to developing countries, as one might expect.  Indeed, from table 1, 
which records the ten lowest and highest trade cost countries, it is evident that some 
industrial countries (e.g. Belgium-Lux, France, UK, and Netherlands) are relatively low 
trade cost countries by all the measures.  By contrast, there is more heterogeneity of the 
membership of the high trade cost category, with large developing countries tending to be 6 
 
captured by the ICY indicator and smaller (often more remote  or landlocked) countries 
(e.g. Mauritius, Malawi, Madagascar and Zambia) being represented as high trade cost 
countries by the market access (MA) and supply access (SA) indicators.  We see from table 
2 that the rankings of average trade costs by region are relatively stable over time for the 
ICY indicator, with Europe, Oceania and North America consistently ranked the first, 
second and third lowest cost regions.  Indeed, Europe is the lowest cost region at the start 
and end of the period for all three trade measures.  There are, however, some changes of 
rank for specific regions according to the measure used.  For example, Africa became 
relatively more costly over the sample period according to the ICY and MA indicators, while 
Asia became relatively less costly according to all three indicators (and markedly so 
according to the SA indicator).  These changes are in line with other information on the 
relative marginalisation of Africa and greater integration of Asia over this time period.  
 
Table 1: Trade Costs and Country Ranking
Country ICY Country MA Country SA
Lowest
Belgium-Lux 5.29 France 41.78 Germany 9.51
Netherlands 10.12 United Kingdom 41.6 Barbados 8.08
Fm German FR 12.85 Fm German FR 41.52 Venezuela 6.79
France 13.18 Netherlands 40.36 Morocco 6.36
Japan 14.97 Belgium-Lux 39.82 Belgium-Lux 6.27
Germany 17.94 Germany 39.3 United Kingdom 6.25
Italy 17.99 United States 38.83 Netherlands 6.21
United States 18.1 Italy 38.27 France 5.88
Spain 19.11 Spain 37.34 Tunisia 5.67
United Kingdom 19.28 Austria 37.02 Portugal 5.67
Highest
Egypt 53.55 Papua New Guinea 24.26 Argentina 2.34
Turkey 53.73 Madagascar 23.83 Uruguay 2.26
Mexico 54.23 Costa Rica 23.27 Brazil 2.24
Brazil 55.11 Bolivia 23.23 Mauritius 2.03
Colombia 55.15 Zambia 23.22 Malawi 1.96
Ethiopia 55.4 Mauritius 22.89 Zambia 1.36
Argentina 56.07 Barbados 21.74 Madagascar 0.9
Pakistan 56.2 Malawi 20.69 Zimbabwe 0.69
South Africa 60.48 Suriname 19.76 Ethiopia 0.61








Table 2: Average regional Trade Costs through Time
Continent ICY 1972 ICY 1992 MA 1972 MA 1992 SA 1972 SA 1992
Africa 48.77 44.75 40.61 18.74 -4.67 5.98
Asia 52.23 39.69 40.30 25.53 -4.85 7.03
Europe 23.30 25.74 44.26 30.86 -.39 8.71
North America 39.97 36.00 39.51 22.06 -1.06 5.34
South America 45.24 43.58 37.68 23.27 -3.19 4.77





One would not be surprised to conceive of the low trade cost countries identified above as 
being relatively high trade countries in volume terms (having controlled for other factors).  
The gravity modelling methodology has been used extensively to show how different types 
of trade costs, or how the reduction of specific sources of trade cost, affect the volume of 
(specific or general) bilateral trade.  Indeed we can show this with our current measures.  
Figure 1 shows the negative relationship between country export values and country trade 
costs (using the market access measure) on average for the present sample period; lower 
(higher)trade cost countries exporting more (less).  What may be less intuitive is the idea 
of a trade composition effect of differences in country trade costs.  The present data also 
suggests that countries with high (low) trade costs export goods that, on average, have a 
low (high) trade cost sensitivity (see figure 2). The present work seeks to explore this 
relationship in more detail, and to assess the thesis that differences in overall country 
trade costs is an additional national characteristic or endowment affecting comparative 
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Figure 2: Average Country Trade Costs and Export Composition (1972-92)
 
3.  Trade Costs in Theory 
 
Specific countries can have attributes (e.g. remoteness or not, landlockedness or not, 
levels of port (in) efficiency or customs clearance procedures) that make them relatively 9 
 
more or less expensive in exporting or importing than other countries.  Thus for trade with 
the same trading partner (and at the same distance and in the same product) there can be 
trade cost differences across countries.  Simultaneously, for each country there are likely 
to be differences in trade costs, depending on whom it is trading with.  An obvious driver 
of these differences is distance between trading partners. However, there will also be 
country-specific characteristics of each trading partner (e.g. landlockedness, port efficiency 
etc) that induce differences in trade costs.  These differences in trading partner attributes 
will affect products differentially, depending on the weight, perishability etc. of products.   
 
Trade cost differences by country 
Trade theory does not typically model all the above aspects of trade costs.  Markusen and 
Venables (2007) for instance incorporate trade costs into an endowments model of trade, 
but allow trade costs only to vary across countries (trade costs being the same for goods 
to/from a particular country and a particular country having the same trade costs with all 
its trading partners).
3  This specification allows for a clearly defined ‘world price’ for each 
good (Xi).  They develop a model of three goods (produced under constant returns and 
competitive conditions), using two factors (capital, K, and labour, L).  With zero (country) 
trade costs the pattern of production across countries would be indeterminate, though with 
full employment we can make predictions about the overall or average factor content of 
trade.  The addition of trade costs (here country-specific trade costs, t) makes the 
commodity structure of production determinate.  Each good Xi is produced in a country 
only if its unit cost is no greater than the import price; with the equilibrium location of 
production satisfying the following conditions: 
 
() t p r w b t p i i i ≥ ≥ ,                     [ ] 3 , 2 , 1 = i    (3) 
 
where  () ⋅ ⋅ i b  is the unit cost function 
and w and r are the factor prices of L and K respectively. 
 
If the unit cost for a particular good is (strictly) within the inequality in (3) the country is 
self-sufficient and the good is non-traded, while it may export the good if the unit cost is at 
the lower end (pi/t) and import it at the upper end (pit). 
 
Markusen and Venables (2007) report numerical simulations for countries assumed to be 






4 and scaled endowments space (from L=0.1 Æ L=0.9, where K=1-L), where 
X1 is the least labour-intensive in production and X3 the most. A key message from their 
modelling for the present purpose is that lower trade cost countries are characterised by 
partial or complete specialisation in production, while higher trade cost countries tend to 
become less specialised in production. Low trade cost countries trade all goods, while the 
incidence of autarky or non-tradability increases with trade costs.  Indeed reduced 
tradability starts to be a feature of increasing trade costs for countries close to the world 
average endowments.  Further, at higher trade costs more extreme endowments are 
required to maintain a country as an exporter of the good intensively using the country’s 
abundant factor. 
 
In the above formulation national trade costs are a modifier of comparative advantage and 
the pattern of trade, through their influence on the tradability of goods. In order to capture 
national trade costs role as a source of comparative advantage we need to represent 
national trade costs as analogous to a traditional endowment. In a strand of the literature 
this has been done in effect by representing national trade costs as the country-specific, 
fixed cost or additional investment associated with the trade impediments that agents in 
that country need to overcome in order to transact internationally. This an extension of 
Levchenko’s representation (Levchenko, 2007) of national institutional differences which 
induce differences in international transaction impediments across countries. In a world of 
trade cost barriers or frictions a fraction (f) of the investment of factor resources (capital 
and/or labour) required to produce certain units of a tradable good become specific to the 
particular activity. In a frictionless world (f=0) agents do not need to invest specific 
resources (ex ante) to acquire information about how the infrastructure and institutional 
characteristics of the economy affect their ability to recoup their investment. Where f>0 it 
is harder to induce resources to enter sectors in general (harder relative to countries 
where trade costs are lower), and the more so in sectors that are more transactions-
intensive; the ex post returns to factors being driven down relative to the frictionless case. 
 
Analogous to Levchenko (2007), we can view trade in a two country or bloc (‘North’–N and 
‘South’-S) case as involving differences in national trade costs such that f
N>f
S ; a lower 
fraction of factors being specific to transactions-sensitive activities in the North than the 
South.
5 In this set-up national trade cost differences act much like a normal endowment 
difference source of comparative advantage in an H-O framework; the North is able to 







Trade costs by trading partner 
Implicit in the discussion so far has been the idea that each country has the same trade 
costs when trading with all other countries.  The basis for identifying comparative 
advantage is global, in just the same way it is when there are no trade costs.  In the 
traditional Ricardian model context, a country (c) has a global comparative advantage in 















<    (4) 
 
If, as Deardorff (2004) does, trade costs are represented as the unit labour requirement 
( c cg t ′ ) of country c serving a particular market (c′), then we can amend (4) for trade costs 
as follows: 
 
Country (c) has a comparative advantage in producing g1 and delivering it to country c’, 























1 1     (5) 
 
It follows from (5) that comparative advantage depends now on both production and trade 
costs.  Comparative advantage is possible when there is comparative disadvantage in 
production costs, if there is a sufficient relative advantage in trade costs.
6  Indeed, if 
relative trade costs are sufficiently high, comparative advantage may not exist in some (or 
all) markets in spite of relatively low production costs.  The implication of this latter 
proposition is that comparative advantage may only be defined locally if relative trade 
costs are sufficiently high; comparative advantage being specific to the countries from 












4. Empirical  Approach 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that trade costs are a source of comparative advantage, 
namely that low trade cost countries have a (global or local) comparative advantage in 
producing goods for which trade costs are important in either their production or 
distribution, we estimate an enhanced endowments model of export shares as follows: 
 
ic c i c i c i t c i ic K k H h T t X ε β β β α α α + + + + + + = 3 2 1                 (6) 
 
 where  ic X  is the share of exports of industry i by country c (globally or locally) 
  c T  is a measure of trade costs of country c 
c H   and  c K  are country c’s endowments of human and physical capital 
respectively 
i t ,  i h  and  i k  are measures of the importance or intensity of trade costs, 
human and physical capital of production in industry i 
  and  i α , c α  and  t α  denote industry, country and time fixed effects. 
 
If comparative advantage is determined globally equation 6 can be estimated for a full 
sample of countries, i.e. irrespective of the geographic or economic distance of a country 
from other countries.  We explore whether low trade cost countries export a greater share 
of those goods that are sensitive or intensive in trade costs through the sign on β1; a 
negative sign being consistent with trade costs being a source of comparative advantage.  
To explore the possibility of comparative advantage being determined locally, equation 6 
can be estimated only for sub-sets of countries clustered according geographic (regions or 
continents) or economic (developed, developing and least developed) proximity. 
 
Data and estimation 
A host of sources were used to construct the dataset.  The data used in the trade cost 
regressions, and in the gravity model from which the market access and supplier access 
variables are constructed, were obtained from the NBER’s World Import and Export 
dataset.  The dataset is available from http://www.nber.org/data.  A description of the 
dataset may be found in Feenstra et al. (2005).  Data on exports between 201 countries at 
the SITC (rev. 2) 4-digit industry level are provided for the years 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987 
and 1992.   
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Country capital and skill endowment data are from Antweiler and Trefler (2002).  Capital 
endowments are measured by the ratio of capital/labour and skill endowments by the ratio 
of the number of workers completing high school to the number not completers.  The 
capital and skill intensity variables come from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry 
Database which covers the years 1958-1996 and is described in Bartelsman and Gray 
(1996).  Information is provided for 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992 according to the 
1997 NAICS industry classification.  Capital intensity is measured as capital per worker in 
each industry, while skill intensity is measured as the percentage of non-production 
workers for each US industry.  It is recognised that the assumption of common and 
constant factor intensities is a strong assumption, and although in line with standard H-O 
theory can be relaxed in subsequent work. 
 
We use the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) 2002 Input-Output table to calculate 
intermediate input intensity as the percentage of inputs in an industry’s output.  As with 
the capital and skill intensity variables this too is assumed to be constant across countries 
but does not vary over time.  Import demand elasticities of substitution are taken from 
Hummels (1999). This information is provided at the SITC 2-digit industry level. 
 
Intermediate input intensity is calculated following the BEA’s system of industrial 
classification.  Using a concordance provided by the BEA the industries are matched to the 
1997 NAICS industry classification.  This can then be matched with the capital and skill 
intensity variables which are provided at the 1997 NAICS level.  A concordance between 
the SITC (rev. 2) 4-digit industry classification system and the 1997 NAICS system is 
provided by the NBER which may be found at http://www.nber.org/lipsey/sitc22naics97/.  
This enables us to match the export data to the industry-level information on intermediate 
input intensity, capital intensity and skill intensity.  The Herfindahl index of intermediate 
input use is taken from Nunn (2007). 
 
In the regressions an industry is defined according to the SITC (rev. 2) system of 
classification.  We do not aggregate exports up to the 1997 NAICS classification system.  
This provides a greater number of industries.  We end up with up to 158 manufacturing 
industries and 71 countries (for which all the right side variables are available) – see 
Appendix 3 for details of countries covered.  (Not all industries are observed in each 
country and year.) 
 
Equation 6 was estimated in double log form for all instances of positive exports at the 








The results of the estimated enhanced endowments model of exports (eq. 1) are reported 
in table 3 for the whole sample of countries; alternative combinations of proxies of country 
trade costs and trade cost intensity by industry being reported in specifications (columns) 
1-4.  There is a consistent pattern of signs and significance across all specifications; with 
positive and generally significant traditional endowment influences (β2>0;  β3>0) and a 
negative trade cost ‘endowment’ influence (β1<0) with significance at the 1% level 
throughout.  The trade cost ‘endowment’ influence is in general separable from other 
country fixed effects, with the β1 coefficient remaining relatively stable to whether or not 
country fixed effects are included.  Table 3 reports for convenience the preferred 
specification with fixed effects included, but the pattern of signs and significance is not 
sensitive to the inclusion of fixed effects.  (Note also that the magnitudes of the coefficient 
on the term tiTc are not comparable for alternative combinations of proxies because of 
scaling differences.) 
 
Table 3: Global Comparative Advantage
        Regression
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
tiTc -.05*** -.02*** -.28*** -.02***
(-3.97) (-4.76) (-14.69) (-3.95)
hiHc .13*** .13*** .14*** .13***
(8.99) (8.96) (9.19) (8.96)
kiKc .10*** .10*** .04 .10***
(3.83) (3.82) (1.44) (3.82)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
ti es input int input int herfindahl
Tc MA SA ICY SA
Number of Observations 21201 21201 18533 21201
R









The results in table 3 provide support therefore for a trade cost-enhanced, endowments 
explanation of global comparative advantage.  To explore whether comparative advantage 
is better defined ‘locally’, we re-estimate specification 1 from table 3 for the sub-samples 
of countries in each of eight continents – Africa, Asia excluding East Asia, East Asia, 
Europe, the Middle East, North America, Oceania and South America.  Note now that the 
dependent variable is exports to the specific region and not globally.  These estimated 
models are reported in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Local/Regional Comparative Advantage
        Regression
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tiTc -.01 -.15 .01 -.02*** .32** -.06*** -.09* .01***
(-.47) (-.78) (1.10) (-2.75) (2.17) (-5.16) (-1.85) (2.75)
hiHc .02 -.17** -.08** .11*** .37*** .10*** .32*** .13**
(.24) (-2.12) (-2.11) (4.27) (4.50) (2.87) (4.41) (2.03)
kiKc -.15 .63*** .21*** .10** -.09 .09 .34** .03
(-1.56) (4.79) (3.30) (2.27) (-.44) (1.34) (2.43) (.26)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ti input int input int input int input int input int input int input int input int
Tc SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA
Region Africa Asia East Asia Europe Mid East Nth. Am Oceania Sth. Am
Number of Observations 1952 1041 3714 8128 517 2751 1095 2003
R






For some regions (e.g. Europe, Oceania and North America) there is little difference 
between the ‘global’ and ‘local’ results; the pattern of signs, coefficient magnitudes and 
significance is similar in columns (4) (6) and (7) of table 4 to that in column (2) of table 3 
(i.e. for the same proxies for ti and Tc), though the coefficient on the physical capital term 
is not significant in all cases.  For the Middle East and South America, however, we find an 
unexpected, even perverse, positive trade cost effect.  This may in part be due to the small 
sample sizes involved, but it may also reflect the effect of the industrial countries’ 
preferential trade policies in deterring intra-regional trade among developing countries.   
Overall, however, the local comparative advantage model does not perform well.  Indeed 16 
 
for Africa we find no significant sign on any endowment term.  The limited importance of 
manufactured exports and high intra-regional relative to extra-regional trade costs may be 
important in this case.  It is difficult to conclude, however, on the basis of these results 
that the ‘global’ explanation of comparative advantage is dominated by the ‘local’ 
comparative advantage model. 
 
Robustness testing 
To check that we are picking up a genuine national trade cost effect on the composition of 
global trade we conduct a number of robustness checks.  In table 5 we explore a 
specification which interacts national trade costs with the traditional endowment 
influences.  This allows us to explore a weaker hypothesis that trade costs modify, rather 
than determine, comparative advantage. 
 
Table 5: Alternative Model Specifications
Regression
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Tc -.02 -.04*** -.22***
(-1.35) (-4.26) (-10.54)
hiHc .07*** .13*** -.34***
(3.34) (8.92) (-6.18)
kiKc .17*** .10*** .33***
(5.44) (3.83) (5.33)
Tc*hiHc .08*** -.01 .51***
(3.72) (-1.57) (8.94)
Tc*kiKc -.07*** -.01 -.21***
(-3.92) (-1.21) (-5.31)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Tc MA SA ICY
Number of Observations 21201 21201 18533
R







We find a negative direct effect on export volumes at the industry level for all three proxies 
of national trade costs, albeit an insignificant effect where the market access (MA) 
measure is used. More importantly there is less robust support for the comparative 17 
 
advantage-modifying hypothesis than we found for the comparative advantage-
determining hypothesis.  The estimation using the ICY proxy for country trade costs is 
problematic, with the sign on the direct human capital endowments effect being negative.  
Even if concentrating the assessment of the alternative model on specifications (1) and (2) 
in table 5, we find mixed and inconsistent interaction effects between endowments and 
trade costs.  In (1), with the market access proxy for trade costs, we find increases in kiKc 
(physical capital) have a decreasing influence on export performance as country trade 
costs increase, while for human capital we find increases in hiHc have a increasing influence 
on export performance as country trade costs increase.  In (2) there are no significant 
interaction effects.  It is difficult therefore to view these mixed results as giving support for 
an alternative model of trade costs as only modifying comparative advantage.  
 
In table 2 we showed that the lower trade cost countries tend to be developed countries.  
It might be that factors relating to the level of development, other than trade costs, affect 
the pattern of international specialisation.  T o  e x p l o r e  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  w e  a l s o  r a n  
regressions (available from the authors on request) in which we added variables to our 
base specification (eq. 5) which control for these development effects.  Interaction terms 
between log GDP and a range of measures of industrial complexity (value-added, degree of 
fragmentation of production, technological upgrading, contract intensity) were added 
jointly and separately.  In all these estimations the coefficient on the term tiTc remained 
negative and significant, even if these additional influences (captured in the earlier 
regressions through the fixed effects terms) were also significant.  
 
We also explore the possible endogeneity issue.  We have assumed so far that trade costs 
are exogenous and that causality runs only from national trade costs to trade 
specialisation.  But reverse causality is also possible, with countries that specialise in trade 
cost-intensive or sensitive products having a greater incentive than other countries to 
develop and maintain a low trade cost environment.  A similar logic must apply also to the 
other endowment terms in our model, with greater or lesser incentives to accumulate 
physical and human capital depending on initial endowments.  The present focus is, 
however, on national trade costs.  Finding suitable instruments – correlated with the 
endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error term – is problematic, as found also 
by others on this topic (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007).  We explored first using the 
Gneralised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator of Arrelano and Bond (1991), where 
lagged levels of the variables are instruments for the endogenous (differenced) variables. 
These results are reported in Appendix 5.  The coefficients on the term tiTc reassuringly 
remain negative (for all the proxies), though those on the human capital term are now 
consistently also negative.  However the robustness of this finding is questioned by the 18 
 
rejection (by the Sargen identification test) of the validity of the instruments in this GMM 
estimator.  We prefer instead to report estimates in table 6 which use freedom to trade 
and legal quality indices from the Heritage Foundation economic freedom index (Heritage 
Foundation, 2002) as instruments.   
 
In table 6 we report the results of the first stage regression of the instruments on trade 
costs and the second stage results for the instrumented regression.  Regressions 1 and 2 
show that in the first stage regressions the instruments are correctly signed (when 
separately included) and significant: countries with superior legal institutions and more 
freedom to trade having lower trade costs.  When both of the co-linear instruments are 
simultaneously included the instruments are not correctly signed in the first stage 
regression, but in the second stage regression the estimated coefficient on the 
instrumented trade cost interaction term is -0.68 (which is significant at the 1% level) and 
the null of over-identification of the instruments is not rejected.  We retain support, 
therefore, for our hypothesis of country trade costs having an influence, along with 
physical and human capital, in being a source of comparative advantage and driving the 
composition of countries’ exports at the industry level. 
 19 
 
Table 6: Estimates using Instrumental Variables
Regression
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Second stage IV estimates
tiTc -.69* .60*** -.68***
(-1.84) -3.95 (-5.50)
hiHc .15*** .13*** .11***
-7.93 -7.95 -4.64
kiKc .10*** .12*** .08**
-3.61 -4.3 -2.56
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
ti es es es
Tc MA MA MA
Number of Observations 20505 19011 10824
R2 0.4 0.41 0.36
First stage IV estimates
ti * Freedom to Tradec -.06*** .21***
(-5.74) -9.51
ti * Legal Qualityc -.11*** .14***
(-14.62) -12.2
F-test 349.31 548.86 10824








6. Conclusions   
 
A number of papers have explored the effect of inter-country differences in specific types 
of trade costs (e.g. contract enforcement as in the case of Nunn (2007) or institutional 
quality as in Levchenko (2007)) on the pattern or composition of international trade.   
Building on that work, this paper explores whether inter-country differences in overall 
trade costs can be viewed as another type of national endowment and source of 
comparative advantage.  We view these differences in country trade costs as reflecting 
sustained (at least over the medium time period) and systematic features of geography 
and stage of development.  These cross country differences are capturing differences in 20 
 
the overall quality of countries’ infrastructure and institutions, and in the competitiveness 
or effectiveness of their business and policy environments. 
 
In fact, we find support for country trade costs being an ‘endowment’ which affects the 
pattern of comparative advantage and export composition.  This is revealed in export 
performance at the industry level for a sample of up to 71 countries and 158 industries for 
5 year periods over the period 1972 to 1992.  Countries with lower trade costs are found 
to export more of those products for which trade costs are more important, having 
controlled for traditional (physical and human capital) endowment influences on export 
performance in manufacturing products and for other industry, country and time specific 
effects.  These findings are robust to a range of alternative proxies of country trade costs 
and trade cost intensity or sensitivity measures at the industry level.  Further, we find 
stronger support for trade costs being a source of global rather than ‘local’ comparative 
advantage.  They are also robust to the specification chosen and to allowance for the 
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Appendix 1: Constructing the Market Access and Supplier Access Variables 
 
Redding and Venables (2004) outline a theoretical model which they use to construct 
measures of market access (MA) and supplier access (SA) that capture geographic sources 
of trade costs.  Estimation of the MA and SA variables necessitates the use of a gravity 
model.  The model used is: 
 
  ij j i ij ij i i ij gdp gdp bord dist x ε β β δ δ γ α + + + + + + = ln ln ln ln 2 1 2 1  
 
where lnxij is the natural logarithm of country-level bilateral exports
8, lndistij represents the 
great circle distance between countries i and j, bordij is a dummy variable equal to 1 where 
trading partners share a common border and zero otherwise and lngdpi and lngdpj are the 
natural logarithm of country i and j’s respective real GDPs.  Specifying the model in this 
way allows us to calculate MA and SA while abstracting from the effects of distance, 
proximity and GDP.  Results from the gravity model are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table A1: Gravity Model Results
Variable 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992
ln distij -3.66*** -3.51*** -2.54*** -2.10*** -2.05***
(-28.21) (-27.65) (-20.11) (-16.63) (-16.33)
borderij 1.21* -2.71*** -2.33*** -1.82*** -1.51***
(1.80) (-4.11) (-3.93) (-2.95) (-2.61)
ln gdpi -.96*** 3.14*** 2.90*** -1.33*** 3.21***
(-5.35) (22.68) (23.22) (-10.57) (27.05)
ln gdpj 2.44*** -1.26*** -1.02*** 3.23*** -1.36***
(12.31) (-9.38) (-8.46) (23.36) (-11.96)
Number of Observations 16274 16274 16274 16274 16274
R












Appendix 2: Average Trade Costs By Country (1972-1992) 
 Table A2: Average Trade Costs by Country (1972-1992)
Country ICY MA SA
Argentina 56.07 30.47 2.34
Australia 32.72 32.33 2.69
Austria 26.33 37.02 4.77
Bangladesh 27.03 5.07
Barbados 21.74 8.08
Belgium-Lux 5.29 39.82 6.27
Bolivia 39.71 23.23 2.74
Brazil 55.11 32.87 2.24
Cameroon 37.36 24.97 3.25
Canada 25.19 36.63 4.59
Chile 36.97 26.35 2.34
Hong Kong 33.1 3.71
Colombia 55.15 29.98 4.86
Costa Rica 32.54 23.27 4.73
Denmark 19.71 36.72 5.28
Ecuador 41.95 27.8 3.83
Egypt 53.55 30.81 3.15
El Salvador 47.94 25.13 5.21
Ethiopia 55.4 28.36 0.61
Fiji 18.91 3.75
Finland 26.09 34.92 4.5
Fm German FR 12.85 41.52 4.13
France 13.18 41.78 5.88
Germany 17.94 39.3 9.51
Ghana 43.1 26.37 2.36
Greece 31.87 33.96 4.19
Guatemala 47.23 27.66 3.92
Honduras 40.95 24.98 4.49
Iceland 29.84 28.15 4.59
India 63.07 32.84 3.1
Indonesia 46.01 31.27 4
Ireland 30.61
Israel 36.06 31.07 3.99
Italy 17.99 38.27 4.8
Jamaica 26.6 5.21
Japan 14.97 36.48 3.05
Korea 38.94 36.86 4.81





Mexico 54.23 31.14 3.41






Table A2.1: Average Trade Costs by Country (1972-1992)
Country ICY MA SA
Netherlands 10.12 40.36 6.21
New Zealand 27.17 29.56 2.37
Nigeria 43.16 29 4.53
Norway 27.08 35.24 5.5
Pakistan 56.2 30.6 2.55
Panama 25.36 4.84
Papua New Guinea 24.26 2.99
Peru 45.25 27.15 3.33
Philippines 48.64 31.53 5.04
Portugal 21.84 34.28 5.67
Singapore 30.89 3.86
South Africa 60.48 30.05 2.44
Spain 19.11 37.34 5.46
Sri Lanka 44.24 26.43 2.91
Suriname 19.76 5.36
Sweden 24.14 36.51 4.81
Syria 30.41 3.93
Tanzania 24.58 0.21
Thailand 38.93 31.81 3.64
Tunisia 50.55 31.2 5.67
Turkey 53.73 34.36 3.69
United Kingdom 19.28 41.6 6.25
United States 18.1 38.83 3.92
Uruguay 37.35 26.57 2.26





Appendix 3: Country Coverage 
 
Table A3: Country Coverage
Country ICY MA SA
Argentina yes yes yes
Australia yes yes yes
Austria yes yes yes
Bangladesh no yes yes
Barbados no yes yes
Belgium-Lux yes yes yes
Bolivia yes yes yes
Brazil yes yes yes
Cameroon yes yes yes
Canada yes yes yes
Chile yes yes yes
Hong Kong no yes yes
Colombia yes yes yes
Costa Rica yes yes yes
Denmark yes yes yes
Ecuador yes yes yes
Egypt yes yes yes
El Salvador yes yes yes
Ethiopia yes yes yes
Fiji no yes yes
Finland yes yes yes
Fm German FR yes yes yes
France yes yes yes
Germany yes yes yes
Ghana yes yes yes
Greece yes yes yes
Guatemala yes yes yes
Honduras yes yes yes
Iceland yes yes yes
India yes yes yes
Indonesia yes yes yes
Ireland yes no no
Israel yes yes yes
Italy yes yes yes
Jamaica no yes yes
Japan yes yes yes
Korea yes yes yes
Madagascar yes yes yes
Malawi no yes yes
Malaysia no yes yes
Malta no yes yes
Mauritius no yes yes
Mexico yes yes yes




Table A3.1: Country Coverage
Country ICY MA SA
Netherlands yes yes yes
New Zealand yes yes yes
Nigeria yes yes yes
Norway yes yes yes
Pakistan yes yes yes
Panama no yes yes
Papua New Guinea no yes yes
Peru yes yes yes
Philippines yes yes yes
Portugal yes yes yes
Singapore no yes yes
South Africa yes yes yes
Spain yes yes yes
Sri Lanka yes yes yes
Suriname no yes yes
Sweden yes yes yes
Syria no yes yes
Tanzania no yes yes
Thailand yes yes yes
Tunisia yes yes yes
Turkey yes yes yes
United Kingdom yes yes yes
United States yes yes yes
Uruguay yes yes yes
Venezuela yes yes yes
Zambia no yes yes














Table A4.1: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Capital intensity (k) 26157 .13 .20 .01 1.34
Skill intensity (h) 26157 .23 .09 .07 .54
Input intensity (input int) 26157 .69 .09 .53 .90
Elaticity of substitution (es) 26157 5.89 2.25 -1.64 9.44
Capital endowment (K) 26157 .02 .01 .00 .05
Skill endowment (H) 26157 .34 .44 .01 2.91
ICY 22743 32.52 16.41 1.50 80.28
Market access (MA) 23880 33.71 9.51 7.30 53.16






Table A4.2: Correlation Matrix
k h input int es K H ICY MA SA
k1 . 0 0
h .31 1.00
input int .41 .10 1.00
es -.08 -.03 .22 1.00
K .04 -.10 -.02 .10 1.00
H .02 .06 -.01 .06 .47 1.00
ICY -.01 -.04 .01 -.06 -.68 -.32 1.00
MA -.00 .01 -.01 .06 .32 .12 -.31 1.00











Appendix 5: GMM Estimates 
Table A5: GMM Estimates
Dependent variable: log Exports (1) (2) (3)
log Exportst-1 .15*** .31*** .14***
(5.70) (10.27) (5.39)
tiTc -1.43*** -6.74*** -.01***
(-11.94) (-14.91) (-5.39)
hiHc -2.44*** -3.15*** -3.57***
(-5.33) (-7.37) (-8.68)
kiKc 1.21*** 1.37*** 1.63***
(7.43) (8.61) (10.71)
ti input int es input int
Tc ICY MA SA
chi
2(5) 1223.50 1019.63 1310.88
Prob>chi
2 .00 .00 .00
Number of Observations 6752 7482 7482
 
Notes: Coefficients are GMM estimates computed using a one step Arellano and Bond estimator.  Dependent 
variable  is  the  log  of  the  share  of  exports.  T‐statistics  reported  in  parentheses.  ***,  **  and  *  indicate 
significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
 
 